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ABSTRACT: In his seminal Orientalism and Religion (1999), Richard King argues that 
Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” 
and “rationality” that has caused them to systematically distort the claims and arguments of 
Eastern thinkers. While King focuses primarily on Western scholarship on the Buddhist and 
Hindu traditions, this essay shows that his argument can also be extended to apply to Western 
scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for Sufism and apparent rejection of Greek 
philosophy has often earned him the reputation of being a champion of Islamic mysticism. I 
argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling categories of ‘rationality’ and ‘mysticism’ that 
have been imposed on him by offering a conception of experiential knowledge that retains its 
roots in the ‘mystical’ Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of 
experientially-grounded modes of knowing. In particular, I argue that al-Ghazālī shows us how 
experiential knowledge is both important to providing motivation for rational action and also 
critical to underwriting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of that 
which is known.    
 




In his seminal Orientalism and Religion (1999), Richard King argues that Western 
scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and 
“rationality” that has been used, both within and without the academy, as a tool to 
manage and marginalize the Orient. According to King, nineteenth and twentieth 
century academics’ use of the category of the “Mystic East” not only served to 
homogenize diverse patterns of life and thought in the Orient (79, 98-101), but also—
indirectly—to help justify various forms of their subordination to the ‘rational’ West. 
In portraying Eastern traditions of thought as “mystical”, King argues, Western 
academics have created grounds for dismissing the insights of these traditions as 
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“inscrutable” and “private” (2-3, 7ff). By contrast, by characterizing Western thought 
as “rational”, he claims, Western scholars bestowed on their own work a kind of “public” 
scholarly authority denied to the East (8-14, 28-34, 82ff). Besides helping to prop up 
pernicious exercises of Western colonial power over Eastern societies (192-193),1 King 
argues, Western scholars’ use of these categories of “rationality” and “mysticism” has 
also served to undermine the reliability of their (supposedly) “authoritative” 
scholarship on Eastern traditions. Since, according to King, the dichotomy between 
“rationality” and ‘mysticism’ is alien to the Eastern texts on which Western academics 
impose it, Western interpretations of those texts often distort their intended meanings 
(161ff). 
King is most concerned to highlight how the assumed dichotomy between 
“rationality” and “mysticism” has distorted Western scholarship on Buddhism and 
Hinduism,2 but in this paper I show how a version of his argument can also be extended 
to apply to Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for the Sufi tradition 
and apparent rejection of Greek philosophy has often earned him the reputation of being 
a champion of Islamic mysticism.3 I will argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling 
categories of “rationality” and “mysticism” that have been imposed on him by offering 
a conception of the experiential knowledge of the “heart” that retains roots in the 
“mystical” Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of 
experientially-grounded modes of cognition.    
The essay will proceed as follows. In the first section, I briefly review how 
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars like Ernest Renan and William James 
portrayed al-Ghazālī as a mystical anti-rationalist, and argue that—even though al-
Ghazālī does emphasize the kind of experiential knowledge that they associate with 
mysticism—he does not fit the anti-rationalistic stereotypes that they impose on him. 
In the second section, I then go on to explore a more recent trend in al-Ghazālī 
scholarship, which reinterprets him as a closet philosophical rationalist. In particular, 
I look at the work of Alexander Treiger (2012), who argues that al-Ghazālī’s 
discussions about the (‘mystical’) religious experiences of the “heart” largely serve as 
strategic covers to disguise his acceptance of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical conception of 
 
1 King argues that since persons’ patterns of life and thought in the East are judged not only to be 
“mystical”, but also—in virtue of that—as “inscrutable” and “private”, those persons are also easily 
characterized as requiring the political oversight of “public”, “rationally” justified Western forms of 
power. Although elements of this argument are found throughout the book, see especially chapter 4, 
“Orientalism and Indian Religions” and chapter 8, “The Politics of Privatization: Indian Religion and 
the Study of Mysticism”. 
2 King provides several case studies to support his argument; see chapters five and six for his discussion 
of Western constructions of (what he calls) the “myth” of Hinduism, and see chapter seven for his 
discussion of Western scholarship on Buddhism. See also Jantzen 1989 for similar discussion of 
scholarship on Christian mystic traditions. 
3 See below discussion on Renan and James, as well as Footnote 4 for more references. While King’s 
original argument is intended to show that the dichotomy between rationality and mysticism distorts both 
Western scholarship on Buddhism and Hinduism and the relationships of power between the West and 
those who partake in these traditions, I will focus on the distorting effects of that dichotomy primarily 
on Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī. 
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the “rational soul”—a conception of the soul that draws on the Aristotelian tradition 
and emphasizes the value of conceptual knowledge and syllogistic deduction. I argue 
that this rationalist interpretation of al-Ghazālī fails to take adequately seriously the 
central role that experiential knowledge plays for him. Finally, in the third section I 
show that al-Ghazālī offers a novel way of understanding the (so called) ‘mystical’ 
experiences of the heart that brings to light the rational merits of such experiences. I 
argue that al-Ghazālī points us to two important insights about the rational merits of 
experiential cognition that Western analytic philosophers have just recently begun to 
appreciate: that is, first, that experiential cognition is important to underwriting 
motivation for rational action and, second, that affective experience in particular is 
critical to supporting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of the 
objects of their knowledge. 
 
1.  AL-GHAZĀLĪ AS ANTI-RATIONALIST MYSTIC 
 
In his 1852 Averroès et l’Averroïsme, Ernest Renan helped inaugurate a long-standing 
trend in Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī in which scholars consistently portrayed 
him, not only as a champion of Sufi mysticism, but also as someone who was hostile 
to philosophy—and, indeed, to ‘rational’ avenues to attaining knowledge, more 
broadly.4 Focusing on al-Ghazālī’s The Incoherence of Philosophers, Renan treats al-
Ghazālī’s arguments against Ibn Sīnā’s Aristotelian-inspired metaphysics as grounds 
to regard him as an “enemy of philosophy” (Griffel 2011, 37, 40). Then, conflating 
philosophy with the larger category of ‘reason,’ he goes on to characterize al-Ghazālī 
as mounting an “attack against rationalism” (97), more generally.   
Although Renan is in some respects right to identify al-Ghazālī as a champion of 
(so called) ‘mystical’ experiential knowledge,5 Renan makes a mistake in also claiming 
that al-Ghazālī is an opponent of philosophy or of “rationality” more generally. His 
mistake is rooted in a double conflation—first, between Ibn Sīnā’s Aristotelian 
metaphysics and philosophy,6 and second, between philosophy and rationality more 
generally. The first conflation is perhaps more excusable than the second, since al-
Ghazālī himself sometimes treats Ibn Sīnā’s Aristotelian metaphysics as 
interchangeable with “philosophy” in his Incoherence of the Philosophers.7 That said, 
al-Ghazālī’s criticism of Avicennan-Aristotelian metaphysics in the Incoherence need 
not be understood as a rejection of philosophy as a whole. For one thing, as Peter 
Adamson (2006) suggests, the word often translated as “incoherence” in the title of the 
 
4 See discussion on William James later in this section. See also: DeBoer 1903, 154-168; Arberry 
1957/2008, 61, Oliver Leaman 1985/2002, Part 1. (The references to Arberry and Leaman are from 
Ahmad 2007, 62.)  
5 I briefly discuss this issue in this section but make a more detailed argument for this idea in Sections 2 
and 3. 
6 For more on the influence of the Aristotelian tradition on Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, see Gutas 2014. 
7 It is not surprising that al-Ghazālī would have done this, since the relevant term of falasifa that is now 
translated as “philosophy” was in al-Ghazālī’s time already specifically associated with those who 
identified themselves with the Aristotelian tradition.  
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book—tahāfut—is plausibly better translated in context as something like “a reckless 
stumble into error”, and the content of the argument contained in the book is arguably 
better understood as a criticism of the ways in which Avicennan-Aristotelian 
metaphysicians have overreached—claiming to have proved more than they have 
actually proved—rather than an wholesale rejection of the value of philosophy (147). 
Additionally, once we look past the Incoherence to al-Ghazālī’s Revival of Religious 
Science, we see that although al-Ghazālī may think that some philosophers have 
wrongly strayed into “unbelief” and “innovation”, he still also recognizes that 
philosophy as whole offers valuable intellectual training on “the science of the being 
and attributes of God”, as well as the topics of logic and physics (1962, 46-47).8   
In addition to there being good evidence that al-Ghazālī was not, as Renan suggests, 
an “enemy” of philosophy, there are also strong prima facie reasons to think that al-
Ghazālī was not antagonistic to ‘rationality’ in any more general sense. For instance, 
al-Ghazālī argues that our powers of intelligence have a “noble nature” that constitute 
our “glory” before Allah, make us superior to other animals, and serve as our “means 
of happiness in this world and the next” (1962, 213). Further, whenever al-Ghazālī 
describes the structure of the soul, he always places our powers of intellect in the top 
position, as the proper and authoritative governor of the soul.9 Thus, for instance, when 
he compares the soul to a horseman who has gone hunting with his dog, it is the intellect 
that serves as the horseman. This horseman (the intellect) is tasked with keeping the 
“horse”—the soul’s “appetence”— and the “dog”—the soul’s anger—under proper 
control, and al-Ghazālī notes that if the metaphorical “hunt” succeeds, it is only because 
of the horseman’s skill—i.e., because of the development of a person’s intellect (1977, 
23-24).  
In light of the above, one might wonder why Renan’s early portrayal of al-Ghazālī 
as someone who mounted an “attack against rationalism” would be able to exert the 
kind of persistent influence on al-Ghazālī scholarship that it did. 10  One potential 
explanation for this persistence lies in the strength of the assumed dichotomy between 
‘mystical’ experience and ‘rational’ cognition. Al-Ghazālī identifies the intellect with 
the heart,11 and—though he grants that the heart’s knowledge may in critical ways be 
supported by (e.g.) powers of syllogistic deduction (1977, 52)12—he claims that the 
 
8 See also footnote 12.  
9 Besides the example I provide here, al-Ghazālī also offers several other examples of the same kind: the 
intelligent power is a “sage” compared with the pig, dog, and demon-like parts of the soul (1977, 20-24), 
and it is the “king” who rules over the “city” of the body (37-38). 
10 See Footnote 4 for references.  
11 For further discussion of this idea, see Section 2. 
12 I discuss this at length in Section 2. Besides what I discuss there, one might also note that in Book 21 
of the Revival, The Marvels of the Heart, al-Ghazālī suggests that the methodology of the syllogistic 
deduction——the methodology also most distinctively associated with Aristotelian philosophy—is a 
necessary scaffolding on the pathway to knowledge. Al-Ghazālī argues that, just as someone who wants 
to see the back of his neck must know how to align and angle two mirrors to get a clear view of his 
desired object of knowledge, so also someone who seeks knowledge, more generally, must be able to 
structure and order the premises in a syllogism, in order to get a clear view of that which he wishes to 
know (1977, 52).  
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real nobility of the heart consists in its capacity to gain “experiential knowledge 
(ma’rifa) of the real nature of things” (1977, 32; emphasis added). It is thus first and 
foremost as an experiential “perceptive power” that al-Ghazālī regards the intellect—
i.e., the heart—as the ruler of the soul (32). If, as King argues, Renan’s generation of 
scholars assumed a strong dichotomy between ‘mystical’ experiences and ‘rational’ 
avenues to knowledge, then al-Ghazālī’s placement of experiential knowledge at the 
crown of our human powers of intelligence may simply have seemed like a category 
error them. Rather than considering how al-Ghazālī’s claims about the importance of 
experiential cognition might have challenged their assumptions about the category of 
the “rational”, it seems that Renan and his later followers may have allowed their 
presuppositions about the nature of that category to serve as grounds for dismissing al-
Ghazālī’s many positive general claims about human beings’ powers of intelligence, as 
well as his more specific assertions about the value of philosophy and the method of 
syllogistic deduction.   
A half-century after Renan’s Averroès et l’Averroïsme, William James depicted al-
Ghazālī as the representative of the mystical tradition in Islam in his Varieties of 
Religious Experience. Although James was more friendly to the epistemic merits of 
mystical experience than some of his contemporaries,13  he still assumed a strong 
distinction between the categories of ‘mysticism’ and ‘rationality’. In the remainder of 
this section, I look more closely at James’s argument for making this distinction and 
show how al-Ghazālī gives us reasons to doubt the cogency of that argument.  
After introducing the Sufi “sect” as the “possessors of the mystical tradition” in 
Islam, James provides an extended excerpt from al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error 
as an illustration of Sufi thinking (1902/2002, 311). A key passage in this translation 
that encapsulates what James finds remarkable about al-Ghazālī—and that will also 
turn out to be important to the argument of this essay—is the following:  
 
[1] How great… is the difference between knowing the definitions of health, of satiety, 
with their causes and conditions, and being really healthy or filled. How different to know 
in what drunkenness consists and being drunk effectively… Similarly there is a difference 
between knowing the nature of abstinence, and being abstinent or having one’s soul 
detached from the world. —Thus I learned what words could teach of Sufism, but what 
was left could be learned neither by study nor through the ears, but solely by giving up 
one’s self up to ecstasy and leading a pious life. (Quoted in James 1902/2002, 312) 
 
Drawing on this passage and the surrounding text in al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from 
Error, James goes on to argue that al-Ghazālī displays what he regards as the key 
distinguishing characteristic of “mystical” thinkers: that is, that he points to an 
 
13  James is more friendly to the epistemic merits of mystical experience than some of his 
contemporaries—while (for instance) Immanuel Kant had disparaged mysticism as merely “counterfeit 
philosophy” (1800/1978, 8: 441; see also King’s discussion of Bertrand Russell 1999, 32-33), James 
claims that it must in principle be left open that mystical states could be “superior points of view” that 
provide “windows” into “a more extensive and inclusive world” (1902/2002, 331). Despite this 
admission, however, James goes on to distinguish mysticism from philosophy by pointing to the superior 
rationalistic credentials of the latter. (I discuss this further in the main text.) 
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“ineffable”, “incommunicable” experience as the basis for knowledge (314). Though 
James grants that such ‘mystical’ experiences have merits as sources of psychological 
delight and motivation, he argues that from the standpoint of reason, the insights of 
such experiences must be subordinated to the superior, more “rational” conclusions of 
philosophy. Thus, James writes that while mystical state is “excitements like the 
emotions” that allow us to establish “new connections” between “facts already 
objectively before us” and “our active life” (331), philosophy takes the “first hint” 
supplied by those feelings, and “deal[s] [with them] in a superior way” (334). While 
states of mystical experience are “private and dumb”, he claims, philosophy is able to 
“redeem [those states] from unwholesome privacy” because it “lives in words” and 
uses “coercive” arguments to establish truths that are “objectively valid for all thinking 
men” (334). By thus executing “reason’s task”, he writes, philosophy helps humanity 
“escape from obscure and wayward personal persuasion” to find “truth objectively 
valid for all thinking men” (334).14  
As suggested by the above quotations, James argues that the distinction between 
the “rational” nature of philosophy and the “non-rational” nature of mysticism rests on 
the fact that philosophy uses discursive argumentation to draw its conclusions, while 
“mystical” avenues to knowledge draw only on ineffable experience.15 But al-Ghazālī’s 
work allows us to challenge the merits of these grounds for making that distinction. 
Why should the ineffability of mystical experience undermine the rational credentials 
of its deliverances?  
James doesn’t offer any independent criterion of “rationality” by which we can 
deduce that the ineffability of mystical experience must make it fail, where discursive 
 
14  Like Renan, James seems to assume that the distinction between mystical experience and 
philosophical argumentation can be mapped onto a more general distinction between mystical 
experience and rationality. Further, and importantly, this distinction in the rational statuses of the two 
activities—that is, the (alleged) rationality of philosophy and (alleged) non-rationality of mysticism—
seems to be used to account for the (alleged) result that philosophical claims are “public” and mystical 
claims “private.” The deliverances of mysticism remain in the domain of “personal persuasion”, it 
appears, because mystics “decline to justify [their results] rationally, whereas (it appears) philosophy 
helps humanity to “escape from obscure and wayward personal persuasion” because it executes 
“reason’s task”.  Though it appears that what is supposed to provide grounds for the conclusion about 
the “private” nature of mystical claims and the “public” nature of philosophical claims is that the latter 
philosophical claims are “rational” while the former mystical claims are not, James does not provide 
adequate resources to support this argument. To make that argument successful, James would need to 
offer an independent criterion of rationality that allow us to distinguish between philosophy and 
mysticism and explain how the presence of that kind of rationality uniquely gives rise to “public” results. 
But James does not appeal to any such independent criteria for what “rationality” is supposed to consist 
in. There is a further problem as well. For all we are told, there is little reason to think that it is because 
mystical experience fails to achieve criteria of rationality that it is “private”. For all we are told, it may 
just as well be the other way round: it may be because mystical experience has already been deemed 
“private” that it is also pronounced to be non-rational (even withstanding its similarities to more “rational” 
experiences). Likewise, for all we are told, there is little reason to think that it is because philosophy 
executes “reason’s task” that it gives “public status and universal right of way” to its claims; it may just 
as well be that it is because it’s claims have been given the status of being “public”, that they are also 
pronounced to be “rational”. 
15 For more on this, see James 1902/2002, 295, 314. 
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argumentation succeeds, at being able to deliver rationally justified beliefs. Indeed, to 
the contrary, James briefly admits that mystical experience plays a role exactly 
correlate to the role that our own ordinary experiences play in supporting our 
(supposedly) more ‘rational’ beliefs: our own “more ‘rational’ beliefs”, James 
acknowledges, “are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics 
quote for theirs”, since mystical experiences are “as direct perceptions of fact for those 
who have them as any sensations ever were for us” (328). Despite initially 
acknowledging this parity in the evidential status of ‘mystical’ and ‘rational’ 
experience, however, James does not go on to discuss the consequences of this parity 
for his larger argument about the distinction between ‘mystical’ and ‘rational’ avenues 
to knowledge.16  
Where James fails to follow through on the parity between the rational merits of 
“mystical” experience and our “ordinary” sensations, al-Ghazālī picks up on and 
advances the argument. In the extended passage of al-Ghazālī’s that James quotes (of 
which [1] above is a part), al-Ghazālī writes that “the transport which one attains by 
the method of the Sufis is like an immediate perception, as if one touched the objects 
with one’s hand” (quoted in James 1902/2002, 314). Al-Ghazālī then goes on to point 
out an implication of this fact about the nature of (‘mystical’) experience that could be 
used as a basis for arguing against James, for the rationality of beliefs based on 
(‘mystical’) experience. Al-Ghazālī writes: 
 
[2] If you were to tell a man who was himself without experience of [sleep] that there are 
people who… resemble dead men… he would deny it [and give his reasons]. Nevertheless, 
his arguments would be refuted by actual experience. (Quoted in James 1902/2002, 313) 
Someone who has not experienced sleep may conceivably be able to come up with a 
discursively communicable, philosophical argument for why one should not believe 
that sleep exists. At least in principle, that argument could even be “rational” in the 
sense that it could (at least hypothetically) be constructed in a way where it validly 
deduced its conclusion from independently plausible, non-question-begging premises. 
Someone who believed in the reality of sleep on the basis of her own experience of it, 
might lack this kind of discursive, deductively valid argument for her belief. 
Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī challenges us to notice that the sleepless person’s argument 
to the person who had experienced sleep would be rationally refuted by the latter’s 
actual experience of sleep. After all, what better rational basis could that latter person 
want for believing in the existence of sleep, than their own direct experience of being 
asleep? Though the experiential nature of the grounds for someone’s belief in sleep 
 
16 James does mention that even if some people have mystical experiences, that provides “no logical 
force” for others to accept their testimony. However, he doesn’t explain whether or how this feature of 
mystical experience sets it apart from ordinary sensuous experience. It would seem that the fact that most 
of us (say) see some words on a page before us as we read this would provide rational recommendation 
to others for believing that those words on this page existed. So James still owes us an account of why 
things are different with mystical experience. For further discussion of the similarities and differences 
between these cases, see Mawson 2005, 163ff. 
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may be “ineffable” and “incommunicable”, thus, this ineffability and 
incommunicability of experience does not necessarily seem to undermine the 
rationality of the beliefs based on it. Similarly, al-Ghazālī’s argument seems to be 
intended to show, the ineffability and incommunicability of (so called) ‘mystical’ 
experience should not be regarded as grounds to deny that such experience can serve 
as a rational avenue to knowledge.  
Judging by the lights of scholars of religion like Renan and James, al-Ghazālī’s 
emphasis on the primacy of experience as a route to knowledge may not only qualify 
him as a “mystic”, but also disqualify him from being properly regarded as someone 
who cares about the importance of human beings’ powers of rationality. However, 
we’ve seen that once al-Ghazālī is taken seriously on his own terms, he cannot be so 
easily assumed to belong to the ranks of the “anti-rationalists”. To follow James and 
Renan in placing him in that category simply because he puts greater emphasis on 
experiential rather than philosophical avenues to knowledge is thus to impose on him 
an alien dichotomy between ‘mysticism’ and ‘rationality’ that risks distorting his views.  
  
2.  AL-GHAZĀLĪ AS PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITIST 
After discussing the shortcomings of Western approaches to scholarship that 
subordinate “mystical” insight to “rational” knowledge, King goes on in Orientalism 
and Religion to critique an alternative approach that flips this hierarchy and instead 
insists that the deliverances of ‘rational’ philosophical argumentation should be 
subordinated to those of ‘mystical’ experience. King objects to this approach, since—
as he points out—it “inverts” rather than “transcend[s]” the dichotomy between 
‘mysticism’ and ‘rationality’ that Western scholars have constructed (1999, 28). 
Because this approach persists in assuming a dichotomy between ‘mysticism’ and 
‘rationality’, King worries that it threatens to continue to distort scholarly discussions 
of Eastern thinkers work.  
Though recent scholarship on al-Ghazālī is not guilty of the precise inversion that 
King discusses, it commits a related inversion in the interpretation of al-Ghazālī’s work 
that similarly fails to transcend the dichotomy between the categories of ‘mysticism’ 
and ‘rationality’. Rather than inverting the traditional hierarchy between these 
categories, several contemporary scholars have instead tried to flip conventional 
interpretations of al-Ghazālī’s work so as to relocate his place within the hierarchy. 
Thus, authors like Richard Frank (1987, 1994), Taneli Kukkonen (2015), and 
Alexander Treiger (2008) have argued that—despite appearances to the contrary—al-
Ghazālī’s noetics is fundamentally the same as that of his more philosophically-
oriented, Aristotelian predecessor Ibn Sīnā.17 Although al-Ghazālī often talks about 
experiential knowledge and locates the source of that knowledge in the “heart”, these 
scholars argue that al-Ghazālī’s fundamental noetic commitments are best understood 
 
17 For discussion of Ibn Sīnā as working in the Aristotelian tradition, see Gutas 2014. 
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by reference to Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the “rational soul”18—a conception of the soul 
that lays emphasis on our capacity for conceptual understanding and for the kinds of 
deductive, syllogistic argumentation that such understanding makes possible.19 Treiger 
goes the furthest, claiming that al-Ghazālī uses talk of the experiences of the “heart” 
merely as a façon de parler. In using such “heart” language, Treiger argues, al-Ghazālī 
“did not intend any radical departure from this philosophical noetics in the direction of 
a more ‘emotional’ noetics of the heart”; rather, he claims, al-Ghazālī used that 
language to “defuse” the philosophical connotations associated with concept of the 
“rational soul” in an effort to make his ideas more “palatable” to the religious scholars 
of his time (2008, 18).  
In this section, I critique several of Treiger’s arguments for claiming that al-Ghazālī 
appropriated Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the “rational soul”.20 I conclude that just as al-
Ghazālī’s noetics can’t easily be fit into the category non-rational mysticism that Renan 
and James try to fit it into, it also can’t appropriately be understood in terms of this 
category of philosophical rationality that is often assumed to provide a counterposing 
alternative to mysticism. This negative conclusion sets the stage for my more positive 
argument in the next section, where I show how al-Ghazālī transcends the dichotomy 
between ‘mysticism’ and ‘rationality’ by drawing attention to the rational merits of (so 
called) ‘mystical’ experience. 
Like the arguments of other Western scholars who King (1999) critiques, 21 
Treiger’s arguments for identifying al-Ghazālī’s “heart” with Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul” 
often depend on a simplified, homogenized conception of the ‘mystical’ tradition at 
stake in his study—that is, in his case, the Sufi tradition. First, Treiger points out that, 
just as al-Ghazālī describes the heart as a “mirror” which reflects the “real nature of the 
thing sought in religion” so also Ibn Sīnā describes the rational soul as a “mirror” upon 
which “the forms of things become impressed” (quoted in Treiger 2012, 62). Treiger 
not only claims that al-Ghazālī gets this analogy of the mirror from Ibn Sīnā, but also 
argues that his decision to follow Ibn Sīnā in using this analogy is evidence of his shift 
away from Sufi mysticism.22 He points out that Sufis like al-Hallaj and al-Bistami had 
pantheistic views that led them to claim to enjoy a kind of mystical union with God in 
 
18 Kukkonen (2015) writes of the “full-scale adoption on al-Ghazālī’s part of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical 
psychology” (162; see also 2008, 217). Frank (1994) argues that though al-Ghazālī “assiduously avoids 
the use of their language”, al-Ghazālī’s “conception of the nature and operation of the mind is 
fundamentally that of the falasifa” [25; see also Frank 1987]. 
19 See e.g., Treiger 2008, 18 and Gutas 2016. 
20 I focus on Treiger because he gives the most extended argument for the relevant claims identifying al-
Ghazli’s “heart” with Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul”. I will not be able to take on a full study of Treiger’s 
arguments but will focus on three important elements of his argument that are discussed in Chapters 1 
and 4 of his Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought. Treiger’s primary attention is on al-Ghazālī’s 
magnum opus, the Revival of Religious Sciences, and I too will focus on that text. 
21 For more on this, see King 1999, 23-25, 185. 
22 In addition to making the point about the pantheistic views of al-Hallaj and al-Bistami that I discuss 
in the main text, Treiger also argues that the representation of the heart as a polished mirror “seems 
absent” from the classical Sufi tradition” (2012, 44). As we see with the examples I cite in the next 
paragraph, this is not the case. 
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moments of ecstatic mystical experience. By analogizing the heart to a mirror that 
merely reflects, rather than being at one with, an external reality, Treiger argues, al-
Ghazālī would have been distancing himself from these pantheistic Sufi views (2012, 
43).23  
While Treiger is right to point out that al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā both used the image 
of a reflection in a mirror as an analogy for knowledge, he is wrong to think that the 
use of this analogy serves as any indication that al-Ghazālī had a preference for Ibn 
Sīnā’s more philosophically-oriented noetics over that of the Sufi tradition. For, even 
if al-Hallaj and al-Bastimi had pantheistically-inclined conceptions of our connection 
to God, there are a great many Sufi’s who didn’t, and who—like al-Ghazālī—used the 
analogy of the mirror to make their point about human knowledge of God. For instance, 
Harith al-Muḥāsibī discusses knowledge of God in terms of contemplation rather than 
ecstatic union, and he argues—as we will see in the next section that al-Ghazālī also 
does—that it is only when one is willing to undergo the discipline of “polishing” the 
“mirror” of the heart, that one gains experiential knowledge of God (Renard 2004, 21). 
Along the same lines, Abu Talib al-Makkī discusses knowledge of God in terms of 
seeing the “vision of [God’s] Face” in the mirror of the heart and writes that the heart 
is “likened to [a] mirror” that reflects “treasuries of the Hidden” (Yazeki 2013, 68, 73). 
Al-Ghazālī explicitly cites al-Muḥāsibī and al-Makkī as influences,24 and so there is 
little reason to think that his use of the analogy of the mirror indicates any attempt on 
his part to move away from the “mystical” Sufi tradition. 
A similar critique can also be advanced against another plank of Treiger’s argument, 
which emphasizes that both al-Ghazālī’s “heart” and Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul” are 
immortal and immaterial. Treiger argues that, just as Ibn Sīnā conceived of the rational 
soul as a non-material entity that, in the hereafter, departs from the body to either enjoy 
“felicity and pleasure” or to suffer “misery and pain”, so also al-Ghazālī thought of the 
heart as a non-material entity connected to the body that is released, in the hereafter, to 
a state of heavenly bliss or hellish suffering (2012, 17-18).25  
As with the previous argument concerning al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the heart 
 
23 In making this argument, Treiger follows the work of W.H.T. Gairdner (1914). 
24 For al-Makkī, see Yazeki 2013, 99 and Nakamura (1984). For Muḥāsibī see Al-Ghazālī, The Book of 
Knowledge (1962, transl. Faris), 218. 
25 The fact that both al-Ghazālī’s “heart” and Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul” are supposed to be immaterial 
and immortal is not by itself very strong evidence for Treiger’s claim that al-Ghazālī directly 
appropriated his concept of the heart from Ibn Sīnā’s concept of the rational soul. Still, there’s more to 
be said for Treiger’s contention here than he himself explicitly advances. A consideration that may have 
been in the back of his mind, and may play some role in motivating his argument, is that in claiming that 
the heart was immortal and immaterial al-Ghazālī would have been distancing himself from one major 
alternative to Avicennic noetics: that of the Asharites, who treated the soul as a kind of corporeal 
principle (albeit a special one; see Kukkonen 2008, 207; for more on the dynamic between al-Ghazālī, 
the Asharites, and the philosophers on this point see Griffel 2009, 285). Al-Ghazālī’s distancing himself 
from a major alternative to Avicennan noetics could be understood as an attempt to hook onto an 
Avicennan noetics. What’s more, perhaps having distanced himself somewhat from the Asharite’s 
theological take on psychology, al-Ghazālī may have been eager not to appear too un-theological, and 
so (as Treiger says) al-Ghazālī may have chosen heart-related language to make his work more palatable 
to religious scholars.    
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as a mirror, this argument concerning al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the heart as 
immaterial and immaterial only gets the traction Treiger wants it to if one does not pay 
close attention to the Sufi tradition al-Ghazālī himself explicitly claims allegiance to.26 
For—like with al-Ghazālī’s discussions about the “mirror” of the heart—al-Ghazālī’s 
position on these matters concerning the immateriality and immortality of the heart can 
just as well be understood to fall in line with the Sufi tradition as with Ibn Sīnā’s more 
traditional philosophical alternative. Al-Makkī, for instance, seems to appeal to a 
duality between body and soul when he distinguishes the heart, as an “internal” tool, 
from the body, which serves as an “external” tool (Yazeki 2013, 52), and Al-Muḥāsibī 
appears to do the same when he argues that the heart operates in an “inner” sphere that 
is the origin of the “external” actions of the body (Yazeki 2013, 37). Al-Muḥāsibī is 
also clear that the human soul must separate from the body in order to enter an immortal 
afterlife. Thus, he writes that: 
 
The angels come to the dead person [upon death] and if he was righteous they say, ‘Exit O 
good soul that was in a good body; exit nobly and receive glad tidings of repose… If 
[however] he was wicked they say, ‘Exit O despicable soul… Exit in disdain and receive 
tidings of scalding.’ (Picken 2011, 145) 
Since there is already a clear precedent within the Sufi tradition for understanding the 
soul as immortal and immaterial, there is little reason to think that al-Ghazālī’s claims 
about the immortality and immateriality of the “heart” indicate any preference for Ibn 
Sīnā’s philosophical noetics over the more (‘mystical’) experiential noetics of the Sufis. 
A third argument that Treiger advances in favor of identifying al-Ghazālī’s “heart” 
with Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul” is more successful in showing that al-Ghazālī has some 
unique debts to Ibn Sīnā—but it still fails to establish that al-Ghazālī does not also 
make a more fundamental shift in favor of the experience-based, ‘mystical’ modes of 
knowing associated with the Sufis. To try to show that al-Ghazālī’s “heart” can be 
identified with Ibn Sīnā’s “rational soul”, Treiger points out various parallels between 
Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the stages of intellectual development that the “rational 
soul” progresses through, and al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the stages of intellectual 
development that the “heart” progresses through. In particular, Treiger argues that al-
Ghazālī closely follows Ibn Sīnā in tracing the maturation of the “heart” through three 
stages of development that Ibn Sīnā had previously described the “rational soul” as 
undergoing: first, the stage of what Ibn Sīnā called the material intellect, which 
represents our pure potentiality for knowledge; second, the stage of what Ibn Sīnā 
called the intellect in habitu, in which the soul gains the kind of axiomatic, a priori 
concepts that are needed in order for it to later be in a position to perform syllogistic 
reasoning; and third and finally, the stage of what Ibn Sīnā called the actual intellect, 
in which the intellect not only acquires facility with a broad range of concepts, but also, 
in virtue of its possession of these concepts, is able to perform syllogistic reasoning so 
as to acquire deductively-valid knowledge on a wide variety of issues.  
 
26 Kukkonen (2012, 543) seems to agree with me on this point. 
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While there are several minor complaints that one might lodge about Treiger’s 
argument as described so far (in which he compares the first three stages of 
development of the “heart” with the three stages of development of the “rational 
soul”),27 the primary problem with his argument is that it does not adequately account 
for the importance of a further, fourth stage of development of the “heart” that al-
Ghazālī adds, that is not present in Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the development of the 
“rational soul”. Al-Ghazālī describes this stage as follows:  
 
[2] The power of instinct… [develops] to the extent that its owner will be able to tell what 
the end will be [or, in Treiger’s translation, “to cognize the outcomes of things”], and 
consequently will conquer and subdue his appetite which hankers for immediate pleasure. 
Whenever such a power obtains, its owner, in view of the fact that he embarks upon an 
undertaking or refrains from it only after a thorough consideration of its end, is called 
intelligent. (1962, 219) 
 
This stage of development is not only left out of Ibn Sīnā’s three-part account of the 
development of the “rational soul”, it is also clearly regarded by al-Ghazālī as the most 
important and highest stage of intellectual development of the “heart”—indeed, he says 
it is the “final fruit and ultimate aim” of all the other stages (1962, 219). The fact that 
al-Ghazālī adds this stage of development to the “heart” that is not present in Ibn Sīnā’s 
discussion of the “rational soul” is strong prima facie evidence that he means to push 
beyond Ibn Sīnā’s neotic framework. Moreover, by the end of this section, we will see 
that al-Ghazālī is not only pushing away from Ibn Sīnā’s noetic framework but is also 
specifically pulling himself towards the framework for gaining experiential knowledge 
that is provided by the (‘mystical’) Sufi tradition.   
Treiger recognizes the problem I have just drawn attention to and tries to address 
it, but his response is not successful in vindicating his conclusion that al-Ghazālī’s 
conception of the “heart” is essentially the same as Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the 
“rational soul”. Treiger argues that this fourth, highest stage of intellectual achievement 
that al-Ghazālī refers to does not constitute a significant departure from Ibn Sīnā 
because al-Ghazālī is actually merely “superadd[ing]” another element of Ibn Sīnā’s 
noetics: that of the “sacred” or “prophetic” intellect (2012, 25). In fact, however, there 
are extremely important differences between the fourth stage of the intellectual 
development of the “heart”—let’s call it, the stage of the fully developed intellect—and 
Ibn Sīnā’s prophetic intellect.  
For Ibn Sīnā, the prophetic intellect is marked by its ability to move from the 
intellect in habitu (the second stage of development, where a person only has the most 
basic axiomatic concepts) to the actual intellect (the third stage of development, where 
 
27 There are at least two complaints one might lodge against Treiger’s analysis thus far. First, in taking 
about the first stage of knowledge—the stage of “instinct”—al-Ghazālī explicitly appeals to al-Muḥāsibī 
as his influence, and so he need not be seen as simply appropriating Ibn Sīnā’s thought there (1962, 218). 
Al-Makkī also discusses an inborn “impulse” to reason (see Yazeki 2013, 73.). Second, at the third stage 
of knowledge, where Ibn Sīnā specifically emphasizes acquisition of concepts that can support broad-
ranging syllogistic reasoning, al-Ghazālī does not. Instead, al-Ghazālī focuses on a posteriori knowledge 
more generally (1962, 219). 
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a person gains a broad range of concepts that allows him to reason syllogistically about 
a wide variety of topics) via an especially strong form of intuitive power called hads. 
Given this power of hads, those with a prophetic intellect do not need to go through 
any arduous process to acquire the variety of concepts needed for robust, wide-ranging 
syllogistic reasoning; instead, they can simply and effortlessly intuit the content of 
these concepts (Treiger 2012, 76). Treiger acknowledges that al-Ghazālī does not ever 
refer to hads in his own voice in authenticated works,28  but Treiger nevertheless 
defends the identification of al-Ghazālī’s fully developed “heart” with Ibn Sīnā’s 
“prophetic intellect” by claiming that al-Ghazālī’s reference to “cognition of the 
outcome of things” in his description of the fully developed “heart” is a “vague 
expression” for prophecy (2012, 24).29 However, this defense is implausible. To begin, 
notice that al-Ghazālī does not seem to think of the fully developed intellect as one 
which simply has a generalized premonition of ‘things to come’;30 instead, what he 
seems to be most concerned emphasize is the practical competences with which the 
fully developed intellect provides its possessor. For he suggests that the person with a 
fully developed intellect is one that can present “cognize the outcomes of things” in a 
way that allows the owner to “conquer and subdue his appetite” and to “refrain from 
[immediate pleasure]” (see passage [2] above; 1962, 219); moreover, al-Ghazālī points 
out that such a person is called “intelligent” for how he is able to choose to undertake, 
or not to undertake, actions in light of his understanding of the outcomes of those 
actions. The person with a fully developed intellect, in other words, has a kind of 
practical intelligence that allows her to appreciate what the good or bad outcomes of 
her choices will be in a manner that is specifically well-suited to motivate her to act 
properly in accordance with what is required to get the right outcomes.  
 
28 He uses it only when talking about the philosopher’s doctrines (see Treiger 2012, 77). 
29 He also points out that, like Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī describes prophetic inspiration as being effortless; 
for instance, he points out that al-Ghazālī writes that for prophets, “obscure matters become clear… 
without learning or instruction” (Treiger 2012, 78). Even if al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā share a conception 
of prophetic inspiration, however, this does not yet indicate anything about whether al-Ghazālī identifies 
his fully developed intellect just or specifically with the one who is prophetically inspired. Additionally, 
Treiger points to a passage in the Niche of Lights where al-Ghazālī speaks of a “reflective spirit” that 
can be subdivided into two kinds, one that requires “instruction, awakening, and help from the outside” 
and one that does not (2012, 75). Treiger argues that, just as Ibn Sīnā’s prophetic intellect might be 
understood as a “higher” version of his third stage of intellectual development (the stage of the actual 
intellect, which has acquired broad-ranging facility with the concepts required to support syllogistic 
argumentation) so also al-Ghazālī’s fully developed intellect can be seen as constituting a “higher” 
version of his third stage of development (where that stage is, according to Treiger, itself the equivalent 
of Ibn Sīnā’s “actual intellect”). However, when al-Ghazālī discusses the “reflective spirit”, he does not 
do so in the context of stages of intellectual development, and so it is not clear what (if any) stage in that 
development he takes this “reflective spirit” to correspond to. More importantly, even if there are two 
kinds of “reflective spirits”, this could very well just indicate that people possess the “actual intellect” 
in different ways; it says nothing about the relation of that “reflective spirit” to al-Ghazālī’s fourth stage 
of intellectual development.  
30 It is also worth noting that, even if he did think of the fully developed intellect as one which has a 
generalized premonition of things to come, it’s not clear how that would relate to Ibn Sīnā’s prophetic 
power of hads, the distinguishing feature of which is its capacity to intuit the content of concepts (see, 
e.g., Treiger 2012, 76).  
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This kind of power of practical intelligence is one that al-Ghazālī frequently 
discusses in other contexts that don’t appear to have anything to do with prophetic 
insight as such and instead seem to be focused on the kind of powers of practical self-
governance that all people are enjoined to exercise. Thus, for instance, consider again 
the following passage I alluded to in the last section, which takes place in the middle 
of one of al-Ghazālī’s general discussions about the nature of the intellect, i.e., of the 
“heart”: 
 
[3] The intellect is like a horseman who has gone hunting. His appetence is his horse and 
his anger is his dog. When the horseman is skilled… he is able to succeed. But when he is 
himself clumsy… then his horse is neither guided under him, nor does his dog go forth in 
obedience to his signs… The clumsiness of the horseman is like the ignorance of a man… 
and his dim insight. (1977, 23)  
 
In this and other passages like it, al-Ghazālī seems to have in mind the same kind of 
power of practical intelligence that he attributes to the person with a fully developed 
intellect: what is distinctive of this intellect is that it is able to use its cognitions to 
correctly regulate action in a way that will, in turn, allow a person to reach relevant 
desired outcomes (i.e., to succeed in the ‘hunt’). But in this and the other passages in 
which al-Ghazālī uses similar metaphors, he nowhere indicates that only prophets have 
the kind of practically-efficacious cognition he is describing.31  To the contrary, in these 
passages, al-Ghazālī seems to lay out a quite general picture of how a fully developed 
human intellect should properly function.  
The final and strongest reason to doubt that al-Ghazālī’s fully developed “heart” 
can be identified with Ibn Sīnā’s “prophetic” intellect is that al-Ghazālī pretty clearly 
seems to think that the kind of practically-efficacious knowledge that the fully 
developed intellect has—let’s call it, supreme knowledge—is the kind of experiential 
knowledge that the (‘mystical’) Sufi tradition gives people access to. Moreover, al-
Ghazālī goes to great pains to distinguish this kind of experiential knowledge from the 
more purely theoretical knowledge of concepts that is supplied by Ibn Sīnā’s prophetic 
power of hads.  
First, al-Ghazālī is clear that he thinks that it is the Sufis who provide the best 
exemplars of those who have fully developed, practically-efficacious intellects. It is 
they, he points out, who are most distinguished for having the kind of knowledge that 
“takes hold of” and “prevails over the heart”, so that it can as a result “[become] the 
ruler… of the soul either by urging it to action or by forbidding it therefrom” (1962, 
188). Al-Ghazālī also demonstrates the practical efficaciousness of Sufis’ knowledge 
by making specific reference to an analogy that involves “tell[ing] what the end will 
be” (as mentioned in his description of the fully developed intellect; see passage [2]): 
he suggests that the difference between the kind of knowledge that the Sufis have and 
other, lesser kinds of knowledge is illustrated by difference between people who know 
their lives will end in death, and appreciate the significance of this fact in a way that 
 
31 See footnote 9 for references to similar passages.  
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motivates them to prepare for death, and people who know their lives will end in death, 
but fail to appreciate that fact in a way that has any effect on their life (1962, 188).   
Besides making clear that it is the Sufis who possess the kind of practically 
efficacious knowledge that he associates with the fully developed intellect, al-Ghazālī 
is also clear about a second feature of this kind of knowledge: that is, that it involves a 
direct experiential presentation of its object. While those who believe by blind 
acceptance are like those who believe that a person, “Zayd”, is in a house on the basis 
of testimony (57-58), and while those who have belief “mingled with proof” are like 
those who believe Zayd is in a house on the basis of deduction from the sound of his 
voice behind a wall (58-59), al-Ghazālī says that the Sufis are like the person who 
“enter[s] the house and look[s] at him with [his] own eyes and see him” (1977, 59-60). 
Only they, he writes, have the kind of “real experiential knowledge” that comes from 
being an eyewitness to something (59).  
In the next section, I will show how the experiential component of supreme 
knowledge connects to its practical efficaciousness. For the moment, however, it is 
important to point out how the prophetic power of hads (as Ibn Sīnā conceives of it) 
does not appear to be at all well-suited to play this kind of practical psychological role 
that al-Ghazālī has in mind for supreme knowledge to play. As discussed previously, 
hads involves cognition into the nature of an abstract concept; in particular, it involves 
that kind of cognition of a concept that is needed for to be able to employ it in syllogistic 
reasoning. But this kind of insight into the abstract nature of a concept does not seem, 
on al-Ghazālī’s view, to be able to have the kind of practical motivational force that he 
associates with cognition at the fourth stage of the development of the “heart”. To the 
contrary, al-Ghazālī frequently emphasizes the difference between merely 
understanding a concept and being motivationally affected by the underlying reality it 
refers to. Consider for instance the important passage cited in Section 1, in which al-
Ghazālī points to the difference between “knowing the definitions of health… and 
being really healthy”, and between “know[ing] in what drunkenness consists and being 
drunk effectively”. Just as knowing what drunkenness (or health) consists is not apt to 
provide the motivational basis for acting in a drunken (or healthy) way, so also more 
generally, knowing the content of a concept does not in itself necessarily do much to 
incline one to act in accordance with the underlying reality it refers to. The person 
whose heart has developed to the fourth stage, thus, does not seem to be someone who 
stands out for her ability to grasp abstract concepts with ease and acuity—as the person 
with the prophet power of hads would. Rather, the person with the fully developed 
intellect seems to be distinguished by the fact that she (i) possesses a kind of 
understanding of the evaluative significance of those objects that, in turn, allows her to 
effectively align her practical conduct with her knowledge, and (ii) has an experiential 
grasp of relevant objects of knowledge.32  
 
 
32 In thus exalting the importance of practical efficaciousness knowledge, al-Ghazālī once again appears 
to be staying true to the mystical Sufi tradition that he explicitly champions: The emphasis on praxis 
over theory is also emphasized by, for instance, al-Muḥāsibī and al-Makkī (Renard 2004, 21-22, 36-37). 
 
 




3.  AL-GHAZĀLĪ ON THE REASONS OF THE HEART 
 
In the last two sections, I have shown that al-Ghazālī’s views about the experiential 
knowledge of the heart neither align with Renan and James’s assumptions about the 
non-rational nature of ‘mystical’ experience, nor fit within the noetic framework that 
Ibn Sīnā associates with the “rational soul”. While my argument thus far has been 
largely negative—aimed to show how al-Ghazālī’s thought cannot easily be made sense 
of in terms of the categories of ‘mysticism’ and ‘rationality’ that others have imposed 
on him—in this section I focus on a more positive task. In particular, I show how al-
Ghazālī anticipated insights about the rational merits of experiential forms of cognition 
that contemporary psychologists and philosophers of emotion have only recently begun 
to appreciate. 
 
3.1  EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND RATIONAL ACTION 
 
In the last section, I argued against Treiger’s claim that al-Ghazālī’s supreme 
knowledge could be identified with Ibn Sīnā’s prophetic insight on the grounds that (i) 
the former appears to play a general role in motivating practical action (for prophets 
and non-prophets alike), whereas the latter is specifically reserved for prophets and (ii) 
the former is experiential in a way that the latter is not. In fact, it turns out that these 
two features of al-Ghazālī’s supreme knowledge are intimately connected: one lesson 
that al-Ghazālī teaches us about experiential knowledge is that it plays a unique and 
critical role in underwriting our motivation to act rationally in alignment with our 
practical goals.  
 Recall that at the third level of intellectual development, which Treiger argues that 
Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī both agree about, a person develops a facility with a broad 
range of concepts that, in turn, allows her to gain knowledge by way of syllogistic 
deduction. It is significant that al-Ghazālī sees an intellect that has only progressed to 
this third stage as not fully developed. By highlighting that the fourth stage of 
development is the “final fruit and ultimate aim” of all the other stages, al-Ghazālī 
encourages us to consider the rational defectiveness of an intellect that stopped short 
of this fourth stage—e.g., an intellect that achieves deductive, conceptual knowledge 
of the results of a person’s actions, but has nevertheless not yet learned to connect that 
conceptual knowledge to the person’s larger system of practical motivation in a way 
that allows her to actually use that knowledge to effectively prompt rational decision-
making. 
Antonio Damasio, a contemporary professor of psychology whose ideas about the 
importance of experiential cognition (we will soon see) al-Ghazālī seems to have 
anticipated, gives an example that helps illustrate al-Ghazālī’s point. Damasio writes 
of a subject, who he calls “Elliot”, who came to him to get certification for disability 
benefits after undergoing a brain surgery that removed frontal lobe tissue important to 
the processing of emotions and feeling (1991, 34ff). Elliot had had difficulty getting 
such certification from others because (as Damasio notes) he in many respects had a 
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“superior intellect” (41). In addition to getting superior results on various subtests of 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (41), he achieved above average results in 
experimental tasks that tested his awareness of, and ability to explain, the consequences 
of his actions (47), and performed “impeccably” on tests assessing his ability to 
conceptualize effective means for achieving successful outcomes (47). Despite all 
this—and despite the fact that, before the brain surgery, Elliot had been a responsible 
and successful employee (35)33—Elliot had been fired from his job because he could 
no longer be relied on to carry out tasks or effectively complete the projects that were 
assigned to him (34, 36-38). When he was assigned to produce a particular outcome, 
he would easily become side-tracked in irrelevant details (e.g. should documents be 
listed by date or size?), or would jump between different tasks in a way that prevented 
him from making any real progress on the overall goals at hand (36-37).  Though Elliot 
may (it seems) have retained the kind of conceptual and deductive powers that Ibn Sīnā 
assigns to his third (and final) stage of intellectual development (i.e. the stage of the 
“actual intellect”)—Elliot’s case shows how one who has not yet gained the kind of 
powers of practical intelligence that al-Ghazālī associates with the fully developed 
intellect will tend to fail to appropriately act on the reasons he takes himself to have (in 
the abstract), and in this respect fail to be fully rational. 
Beyond just pushing us to recognize that an intellect that has not yet learned to 
integrate theoretical knowledge with practical action is in some respects not yet fully 
developed, Al-Ghazālī also offers insight into why experiential knowledge plays a 
critical role in supporting that needed integration. Making reference to a kind of 
“certainty” and “faith” that he elsewhere describes in experiential terms,34 al-Ghazālī 
writes:  
 
[4] When a man’s certainty is strengthened—I mean by this the knowledge that is called 
faith—[this certainty is] certainty that the appetite is an enemy… [This] power of 
knowledge and faith… makes the evil consequences of the appetite appear odious.  (2011, 
15-16; my emphasis) 
 
Here, al-Ghazālī suggests that experiential knowledge can motivate us to avoid 
evaluatively bad outcomes because it can present knowledge of those outcomes in a 
particular, phenomenologically charged way. A person who represents consequence of 
action as “evil” in a purely abstract, conceptual way will plausibly need to rely on some 
further, external motivational power to operate on that abstract presentation so as to 
spur action. However, consequences that are presented to a person as “evil” in an 
experiential way can build into that presentation of evil, a presentation of evil as odious, 
 
33 He had also been described as a good husband and father, and a role model for colleagues and siblings 
(35). 
34 In The Marvels of the Heart (1977), al-Ghazālī discusses “three degrees” of faith; the third degree of 
faith is the faith that “is seeing clearly with the light of certainty”, and this is the “faith of the mystics” 
(57). Later in the same passage, al-Ghazālī discusses the example of the three ways of coming to know 
that “Zayd” is in a house, an example I discussed in Section 2. 
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and thus as undesirable and as to be avoided.35 Since an experiential presentation of 
the outcomes of one’s actions can be phenomenologically “charged” in this way, 
knowledge based on experience is plausibly poised to “jump-start” someone’s engines 
of motivation in a way that pure conceptual knowledge would not be. This, in turn, 
means that experiential knowledge can serve to rationally integrate what a person 
knows within a larger system of rational action, in a way that purely conceptual 
knowledge would (it seems) not be equally effective at doing.  
To get a further intuition of what al-Ghazālī may be after here in highlighting the 
experiential component of practically efficacious knowledge, consider this example 
that philosopher Michael Stocker (1983) provides in the course of critiquing 
contemporary philosophical psychologists for their failure to appreciate the importance 
of (what he terms) “psychic feelings”. Stocker asks us to imagine the difference 
between knowing that walking on ice is dangerous before and after a nasty fall on the 
ice. Before the fall one may have a purely intellectual representation of the danger of 
walking on the ice, and this (he points out) may give rise, at best, to a “rather pro-forma 
desire” to avoid that danger (153). Though you may formally desire to avoid putting 
yourself in a dangerous position, your merely intellectual understanding of the danger 
of walking on ice may cause you be incautious and to take risks with the ice that are 
not aligned with the reasons you (abstractly) know you have not to take. After the fall, 
however, Stocker notes, the dangers of walking on ice are experientially present to 
you—you “feel” the dangers, rather than just knowing of them—and so become 
viscerally concerned about those dangers (20-21).36 With this experiential knowledge 
of the dangers of walking on ice now in hand, you will plausibly be better positioned 
to act in accord with the practical reasons you have to walk on the ice in one manner 
rather than another: because, as al-Ghazālī suggests (in passage [4]), the “evil 
consequences” of walking on ice now “appear odious” to you, you will be in a better 
position to be motivated to act with the amount of caution and care that the situation 
actually calls for. It is because experiential knowledge presents its object in this 
phenomenologically-charged way that—as the old adage goes—“experience is the best 
teacher”; experiential knowledge is well-suited to motivate practical action in a way 
that conceptual and deductive knowledge (of the sort Ibn Sīnā assigns to the actual 
intellect and the prophet’s power of hads) seems ill-fit to do. 
Al-Ghazālī’s insight about the importance of experiential knowledge to practical 
rationality also anticipates the psychological diagnosis that Damasio gives for Elliot—
a conclusion that, it bears noting, Damasio regarded as a new insight in the context of 
the psychological research programs of his time, which focused on behavioristic and 
computational models of the mind (1994, ix-x). Damasio argues that it is the “cold-
bloodedness” of Elliot’s reasoning—i.e., the lack of experienced feeling associated 
with the representations of means and ends in his practical reasoning—that caused him 
 
35 For more discussion of the content of this kind of phenomenal representation see Coetsee 2020 and 
Siegel 2014. 
36 Here, your experiential knowledge of the danger of walking on ice will, as al-Ghazālī puts it in passage 
[4], make the “evil consequences” of doing so “appear odious”. 
 
Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)  COETSEE 
 
50 
to act in the erratic and irrational ways that he did (51).37 According to Damasio, 
Elliot’s incapacity to (e.g.) represent the outcomes of a project his employer tasked him 
to pursue in a felt positive light prevented him from being able to assign value to those 
outcomes in the way that could motivate him to keep his attention on them. This, in 
turn (Damasio argues), undermined Elliot’s ability to be follow through with subtasks 
in a way that efficiently ordered them towards the achievement of his overall goal (51). 
Al-Ghazālī seems to want to teach his readers that those who, like Elliot, lack an 
experiential cognition of the goodness or badness of the outcomes they pursue will be 
“clumsy” in their “hunt” to achieve their practical goals ([3]; 1977, 23). In this way, al-
Ghazālī also helps us to see certain important rational merits to ‘mystical’ experience: 
insofar as ‘mystical’ experience makes experientially present to people (e.g.) the 
goodness of God, or the badness of an eternity outside of God’s presence, that would 
(al-Ghazālī shows) contribute to—rather than undermine—their capacity to act as the 
“rational animals” that Aristotelian philosophers have always envisioned people to 
be.38  
3.2  EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND EVALUATIVE INSIGHT 
Al-Ghazālī also draws our attention to a second way in which experiential knowledge 
is critical to the operation of human rationality: he highlights how affective experience 
can play a critical role, not just in motivating action, but also in underwriting persons’ 
full understanding of the evaluative features of the value-laden realities that confront 
them.39 According to al-Ghazālī, the way that the “mirror” of the heart is able to come 
to gain religious knowledge—or, as he puts it, to “reveal… the real nature of the thing 
sought in religion”—is by way of being “polished” by virtuous action (1993a, 15).40 
Moreover, al-Ghazālī characterizes the development of virtue in part in affective terms; 
according to al-Ghazālī, part of what it is for a person to develop virtue is for her to 
become habituated to find pleasure in good things. He writes: 
 
[5] If anybody wishes to acquire the virtue of benevolence, he must be habituated to make 
charity inspite of his unwillingness to spend money… Then it will become easy after place 
of time. He who finds pleasure in charity is called a philanthropist. (1993b, 53) 
 
37  Damasio’s discussion of the core elements of his view—which he terms the “somatic-marker 
hypothesis”—occurs in chapter eight of his book (1994).  
38 See Boyle 2012, 399. 
39 This view is also hinted at by Damasio (1994, 51), but he does not discuss it at length.   
40 This is from Karim’s translation of The Marvels of the Heart (1993). Skellie (1977) translates it 
slightly differently: “The heart is a mirror which is polished by praiseworthy action… so that there is 
revealed in it the real nature of the thing sought in religion; but it is tarnished and rusted by blameworthy 
action so that good is not perceived” (30). Al-Ghazālī continues along these lines: “All of this is an 
indication that the light of knowledge is not veiled from men’s hearts by a stinginess or prohibition on 
the part of the Giver… but rather is it [sic] veiled by wickedness, uncleanness, and anxiety within the 
heart. For hearts are like vessels; as long as they are filled with water air cannot enter them. So the 
knowledge of the majesty of Allah cannot enter into hearts which are occupied with anything else apart 
from Him” (1977, 30). For related discussion, see Chapter 6 of The Marvels of the Heart (1977, 46-53).  
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To acquire [felicity]41… it is not sufficient to hate sins. He must find pleasure in doing 
good deeds. (1993b, 53)  
One should grow habits of doing good deeds. If they are done for long... pleasure will come 
as a matter of course. (1993b, 54)  
If, as al-Ghazālī suggests, virtue consists partially in learning to feel certain ways about 
the good actions we are enjoined to undertake, and if (as we saw above) al-Ghazālī also 
holds that such virtue is necessary to “polish” the mirror of the heart to the point that it 
can successfully “reflect” the “real nature” of the good(s) sought in religion, then it 
seems to follow that al-Ghazālī thinks that affective experience not only serves to 
practically motivate rational action, but also that it can actually help make possible a 
kind of understanding insight into the reality of (e.g.) the good(s) sought in religion, 
that would not be possible absent such experience.42 Al-Ghazālī also suggests a similar 
intellective role for affective experience elsewhere, when he draws attention to the tight 
connection between the experience of love of God and knowledge of God. He writes 
that the “sign” of someone’s having genuine experiential knowledge of God is that she 
loves God, and he suggests that it is only those who love God who truly know Him 
(2016, 47).43  Although we don’t normally understand knowledge of a thing as needing 
to involve any particular kind of affective experience of it, this suggestion that love of 
God is required for genuine knowledge of God stands in line with the role al-Ghazālī 
seems to assign to affective experience in “polishing” the mirror of the heart: in both 
cases, what is at work in producing knowledge of the “real nature” of things is not a 
disinterested, cognitive perception of them, but rather the a certain kind of affectively-
attuned, experiential presentation of them.  
In highlighting the role that affective experience can play in cognition, al-Ghazālī 
again anticipates an insight about the rational merits of experiential knowledge that 
Western scholars—in particular, in this case, Western analytic philosophers—have 
only recently come to appreciate. 44  In the Western analytic tradition, affective 
phenomena have often been regarded as forces that can, at best, only properly influence 
how we react and respond to a world that we should—if we are genuinely rational—
perceive on independent, affect-less terms.45 While this tradition may leave room open 
 
41 In Karim’s translation this word is “fortune”, but Winter (2016) translates it as “felicity” (32-33) and 
this seems more fitting.  
42 Moosa (2005) notes that in late antiquity, the heart was generally seen as being the seat of emotion 
(224). If, as seems plausible may have been the case, al-Ghazālī picked up on this trend, that gives further 
evidence for the cognitive importance he assigned to affect. 
43 It is also worth noting that al-Ghazālī thinks that virtue underwrites love of God—its purpose is to 
“cut off the attachment of the world from soul and to confine [one] to the love of God” (1993b, 53). 
44 By “Western” philosophy, I have in mind primarily Western secular philosophy.  
45 See Dixon (2003) for an excellent overview of the history of the treatment of emotions in Western 
philosophy. Interestingly, he notes how other religious thinkers like, e.g., Augustine also had an 
appreciation of the cognitive aspect of religious emotions (26ff). In analytic philosophy, philosophy of 
mind has long been dominated by the computational theory of mind, which sets aside phenomenological 
features and instead attempts to account for the minds’ operations in functional terms. For classic 
statements of this view, see Fodor (1975, 1987). 
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for affect to play a dynamic role in spurring rational action, any influence that that 
affect has in “coloring” our initial perception of reality must (by the view of this 
tradition) by necessity constitute a rational distortion of that reality. Thus, for instance, 
even if seeing the world through “rosy colored glasses” might effectively motivate 
actions that have practical benefits, such an affectively-infused perception of the world 
must, by virtue of being affectively-infused, in some respect distort the way the world 
“really is”.    
 Perhaps not coincidentally, given his negative views about the rationality of 
“mystical” experience, William James (who we considered in the first section) did a 
great deal to popularize a version of the “non-cognitivist” view about affect I have just 
described. His position as the (so called) “father” of modern psychology helped 
popularize his account of emotions as mere “bodily feelings” that do not add any 
rational, representational content to our perceptions.46 Thus, recall his comment that 
mystical experiences are “excitements, like the emotions… by means of which facts 
already objectively before us… make a new connection with our active life” (my 
emphasis; 1902/2002, 334). While James here acknowledges that someone’s lack of 
affective experience might undermine her motivation to act on facts, he seems to deny 
that such experience could also be essential to her genuinely grasping or understanding 
the realities underlying those facts—it seems that on his view, relevant realities are 
always equally cognitively graspable without such experience.47 
Of course, there may be some affective experiences that function merely as 
motivational “bodily feelings” of the sort James has in mind. Perhaps, for instance, a 
brute compulsion to eat a Snickers bar after a long day doing heavy outdoor labor is 
that way. But as al-Ghazālī seems to have anticipated—and as a growing number of 
accounts of “cognitive” and “evaluative” emotions discussed by contemporary Western 
moral philosophers like Linda Zagzebski (2003, 104-24; 2004, 51-95), Martha 
Nussbaum (1990, 2001), and Robert Solomon (2003, 2007) 48  remind us—many 
affective experiences carry a much richer representational content than that of the brute 
compulsion for a Snickers bar; they add a component of cognitive understanding of 
that which is represented in experience, which would be lost but for that affective 
element of the experience.  
An example inspired by a story from Martha Nussbaum (2001, 19-24) helps 
illustrate this point. Suppose you read in the morning newspaper that someone has died 
in a car crash. Though you read a description of the deceased that makes them out to 
be a wonderful person, you at first cognize the report of their passing in a theoretical 
and largely affectless way—as just one among many unfortunate events reported in the 
day’s news. Then, however, you find out that the person is a close friend you valued 
and admired. Now, your experience of the event shifts: you are unsettled and distressed, 
grief-stricken by the thought of world’s being without the person with all the wonderful, 
 
46 For discussion of James’s historical influence, see Dixon 2003, Chapters 1 and 7. 
47 For more on James’ views, see Dixon 2003, 7 and Deonna and Teroni 2012, Chapter 6.  
48 See also Blum 1994. 
 
Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)  COETSEE 
 
53 
valuable qualities you experienced her as having.49 Nussbaum suggests that it is only 
after you apprehend the loss in this latter, affectively-mediated way, that you genuinely 
grasp the moral (dis)value of that loss.  
More specifically, Nussbaum argues that it is in virtue of now apprehending the 
loss of your friend in this affectively-mediated way that you grasp its negative 
evaluative significance. Nussbaum puts the thought well when she talks about the 
experience of grieving after a similarly shocking loss of her mother: “when I grieve,” 
she writes, “I do not first of all coolly embrace the position, ‘My wonderful mother is 
dead,’ and then set about grieving” (45, my emphasis). “No”, Nussbaum argues, the 
“real full recognition” of that loss of value is the affective “upheaval” (45). Similarly, 
in our example (Nussbaum would argue), you do not genuinely and fully assent to the 
proposition that ‘my dear and valued friend is lost’ until you take on and allow yourself 
to imbibe in the felt experience of that loss. To take one more example of Nussbaum’s 
point, one might compare the emotionally vivid experience of a young soldier in 
military combat, to that of someone who has been fighting in combat for years and has 
become numb to it. Plausibly, even though the older soldier knows more about war, in 
a purely intellectual sense, the younger one—who still experiences war in an 
emotionally ‘alive’ way—understands and appreciates something true about the ‘hell 
of war’, about the tragedy and deep disvalue that is associated with combat, that the 
older, emotionally numb soldier has lost touch with. In both cases, contrary to what 
James would suggest, the evaluative facts about the loss of your friend, or about the 
‘hell’ of war, aren’t fully present to the knower prior to their taking an affectively-
mediated perspective on those facts. That affectively-mediated experience partially 
constitutes the knower’s full grasp of the evaluative properties before them, i.e., in this 
case, their moral disvalue. 
While al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the role that pleasure and love play in 
underwriting the heart’s cognition of the things “sought in religion” (1993a, 15) may 
initially seem far-fetched to some, we are now in a position to appreciate the insight 
that that discussion offers. Just as, in the example inspired by Nussbaum, you do not 
genuinely grasp the moral disvalue of your friend’s passing when you merely “coolly 
embrace[s]” the proposition reported in the news, so also, one might say, we do not 
genuinely grasp the value of (e.g.) charity—or the goodness of other things God may 
reveal to a “polished” heart—merely by abstractly, conceptually understanding that 
being charitable is valuable. Instead, that grasp of the positive value of charity—or 
other good things revealed in religion—is at least partially constituted by the 
experience of delight and pleasure that a virtuous person has in reflecting on or 
undertaking acts of charity. Along the same lines, al-Ghazālī suggests that we do not 
genuinely grasp (e.g.) the goodness of God when we have a merely conceptual 
 
49 You have two representations of the situation, one of which underwrites an understanding of the 
evaluative significance of the event, and one which doesn’t; moreover, the one that underwrites that 
understanding is the one that presents the relevant facts in an affectively infused light. On Nussbaum’s 
view, it is by virtue of the fact that the latter representation presents the loss of a person in an affectively 
infused light that one who has that kind of representation is able to fully and genuinely represents the 
loss of that person, as a valued someone. 
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representation of the fact that God is good. As, in the example considered above, the 
genuine understanding of the moral disvalue of a person’s passing is inextricably 
intertwined with, and underwritten by, the experience of grief at his loss, so also, al-
Ghazālī challenges us to notice, one’s genuine understanding of the positive value of 
God is inextricably intertwined with, and underwritten by, the kind of loving 
orientation via which one experiences God. The real, full recognition of God’s 




I have argued that al-Ghazālī’s conception of experiential knowledge transcends the 
dichotomy between philosophical rationality and mysticism that Western scholars of 
religion have used as a lens through which to interpret his work. In the first section, I 
argued that al-Ghazālī’s conception of experiential knowledge doesn’t fit comfortably 
into James and Renan’s category of non-rational mysticism because it does, contrary 
to their assertions, appear to be able to provide a rational basis for belief. In the second 
section, I argued that al-Ghazālī’s conception of experiential knowledge also doesn’t 
fit comfortably into the category of philosophical rationality in which recent authors 
like Alexander Treiger want to fit it, because it is distinct from the kind of abstract 
conceptual understanding that is associated with that form of rationality. I closed by 
highlighting two positive lessons that al-Ghazālī teaches us about why (“mystical”) 
experiential knowledge should not be cordoned off from the realm of the “rational”: 
first, the lesson that experiential knowledge is critical to underwriting motivation for 
rational action, and second, the lesson that experiential knowledge is uniquely capable 
of affording its possessor with a genuine understanding of the value (or disvalue) of 
that which is known. In both these respects, I have argued, al-Ghazālī shows us how 
rationality can properly enter the emotional, experiential domain of the heart—of how 
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